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Abstract
Decision analysis has been criticized by some practitioners for its
inability to deal with strategic planning problems. It typically starts
with the assumption that a problem has been recognized and stated and
that the task of the step-wise decision analysis process is to indicate
the optimal strategy in terms of a specified choice criterion. Writers
such as Ackoff, Mason and Mitroff, and Raiffa have argued that this
approach may lead to solving the wrong problem and that this is potentially
dangerous, particularly in the context of ill-structured, planning
problems.
The paper develops an understanding of the process of organizational
problem formulation through the examination of current literature and
research. This is a necessary prerequisite for discussing the value of
decision aids for strategic planning. Approaches to problem formulation
such as matching of problem to problem type, creativity stimulants, and
dialectical inquiry and devil's advocate are examined as well as an
expanded view of decision analysis as a policy dialogue process. Finally,
the relationships between the various approaches are examined and a
synthetic model for their use in problem formulation is suggested.

INTRODUCTION ' ' '
Strategic planning can be considered a type of ill-structured de-
cision-making. It has been argued that decision analysis, which has
proven effective in dealing with relatively well-structured problems, is
of little value in the ill-structured problem solving which characterizes
strategic planning. '**'' • * '
The decision analysis paradigm is both an approach to decision-
making and a set of techniques. The approach involves consideration
of issues such as the decision-maker's search for alternative strategies,
the recognition and subsequent assessment of the uncertainty inherent
in the problem and the process by which policy judgments about an appro-
priate course of action are made. It, therefore, allows a decision-
maker to carry out a thorough and logical evaluation of alternative
strategies in order to determine systematically the 'best' available
strategy in terms of some stated preference criterion for choice amongst
them. Thus, decision analysis provides a basic model of rational choice
under uncertainty for an individual decision-maker.
Decision analysis typically starts with the assumption that the
problem has been identified and stated and that the task of the analyst
is to provide a solution. Managers, however, are interested in the
processes of problem recognition and diagnosis. Problem recognition can
be facilitated by the identification of signals such as lost profit or
by a pattern in a series of prior events which provides an indication of
how the problem arose. Problem diagnosis is achieved by specification
of the organizational context of the problem, by the identification of
key uncertain variables and by the generation of feasible alternatives
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for problem solution. These processes of problem recognition and diagnosis
are missing links in the effective application of the decision analysis
approach to strategic planning. j
.
In this paper, a broad view of decision analysis is adopted. Decision
analysis is viewed as an approach to problem solving somwhat similar to the
diagnostic, clinical component in medical training. It is, therefore, a
'thinking algorithm' or 'decision structuring' framework for the decision-
maker. Second, it is contended that decision analysis should be regarded
as an analytic decision aid rather than as a technology for developing
an optimal solution. A decision analysis can best be thought of as a
multi-stage decision procedure involving the following steps (see Raiffa
[48], Brown, Kahr and Peterson [6], Moore and Thomas [43]) problem decom-
position; decision structuring; probability and utility assessment; solution
income of expected utility; sensitivity examination; decision review
and implementation. Schematically, the process is depicted in Figure 1:
Insert Figure 1 about here
Whilst some authors quoting papers such as (Brown [4], Greiner [20],
Conrath [10]), point to the limited range of application of such ap-
proaches, we would not share this view. The more recent work of, for
example, Keeney and Raiffa [29], of Brown, Kahr and Peterson [6], Kaufman
and Thomas [28], and Moore, Thomas, Bunn and Hampton [44] lists an
impressive range of applications—even though some authors (e.g.. Lock
[34]) have questioned the soundness of these applications in terms of
issues such as the organizational resistance to the approach and the
fact that the analytic conclusions were rarely substantially implemented.
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They have argued that implementation is hindered both by poor problem
formulation and also by the inability of decision analysts to recognize
that the approach is essentially an organizational 'intervention' mechanism
requiring careful design in the context of a political decision-making
process.
Rex Brown [5], an acknowledged expert and a prominent decision analysis
consultant, recently made the following statement:
Decision analysis may well turn out to be one of the
most influential aids towards the world's conduct of
its affairs. Certainly the pace of application has
perceptibly quickened during this past decade at
upper levels of government and industry in the
United States.
He continues as follows:
The first major field of application was business.
Probably a third of the five hundred largest busi-
nesses now make some use of decision analysis, many
of them at board level. To take just one organiza-
tion, at least three senior executives of Ford Motor
Company, have based major decisions on systematic
analysis: one used it in the decision to drop con-
vertibles; another to evaluate a move into the tire
business; the third to adjust prices on tractors.
A number of authors (see Kunreuther and Schoemaker [30], Jenkins
[27], Moore and Thomas [43]) have pointed out that despite the strong
assets inherent in the approach, it has not lived up to its potential.
The reasons given range from the inadequate attention given to organiza-
tional processes (such as for example the potential relationship between
the organization's ability to cope with uncertainty and the organiza-
tional structure) to a concern, often expressed, that insufficient
allowance is made for the descriptive content of the process of problem
formulation.
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On the other hand, congnitive psychologists and systems scientists
are generating debate about problem formulation and are seeking to inte-
grate descriptive and prescriptive decision-making analyses. Tversky and
Kahnemann [57] are prominent amongst the cognitive psychologists interested
in decision analysis. They have demonstrated the crucial importance of
designing meaningful decision frames and problem formulation in the context
of applied decision analysis. They state that the relative attrac-
tiveness of options in a decision situation varies when the same decision
problem is framed in different ways. The authors have obtained systematic
preference reversals by changes in the framing (or formulation) of deci-
sion problems. These formulation changes have consisted of variations
in the framing of acts, uncertain events, or outcomes. This dependence
of preferences on decision problem formulation has significant consequences
for the theory of rational choice. Thus, in Tversky and Hahnemann's words,
adoption of a decision frame is an ethically significant act.
Ackoff [1], a proponent of the systems approach, catalogues the
weaknesses of rationalistic approaches known under the general heading
of operations research (and these would also presumably apply to the
approach known as decision analysis). He suggests that in the organiza-
tional context the operations research (OR) paradigm should be replaced
by one directed at designing a desirable future and inventing ways of
achieving successful implementing of that future. Further, OR should
replace its problem-solving orientation by one that focuses on interactive,
planning for, and design of, systems.
In this interactive planning process, the formulation phase,
described as "formulating the mess", is considered to be very important.
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In this phase, Ackoff notes the importance of managerial involvement in
the identification of problems and prospects facing the organization.
Through this involvement, managers become better sensitized to the rela-
tionships between problems and problem variables and can begin to concep-
tualize them as a system. His view is that such conceptualization requires
skills of integration and synthesis rather than decomposition and analysis.
Further, the mess often is best formulated through scenarios of likely
futures of the organizations which are based on the (not necessarily
valid) assumption that no significant changes will be made in current
organizational policies and practices.
Ackoff also believes that most problem identifiers lack a WELTANSCHUNG
or world view. They are uncomfortable in the world of ideas and like to
formulate problems in terms of closed mechanical systems. They do not
understand the structure or functioning of organizations, business or
government, nor of the environment which contains them.
This paper concentrates on the processes of problem formulation and
structuring in relation to decision analysis. It addresses particularly
those problems often categorized as ill-structured, unprogrammed, and of
strategic concern to the organization. Subsequent sections will focus
on three main topics. First, the processes of organizational problem
formulation will be examined, as well as appropriate paradigms for
conceptualizing this process. Second, aids for problem finding and
formulation will be discussed. Evidence which bears upon the role and
value of such aids will be presented. Finally, a synthetic model will
be developed which attempts to integrate these aids within the strategic
planning framework.
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At this initial stage, it is appropriate to provide working definitions
of two terms which will be used frequently, namely problem and problem
formulation .
A problem exists if there is a gap between an existing or antici-
pated state of affairs (performance level) and some desired state (a
set of goals or objectives), and if someone wishes to accept the respon-
sibility of attempting to close that gap. Problems can arise as a result
of performance deficiencies, threats to future performance, or opportuni-
ties which may alter goals or objectives.
Problem formulation is the process of formulating the present set
of conditions, symptoms, causes, and triggering events into a problem
or set of problems sufficiently well specified so that the risk of using
analytic procedures to solve the wrong problem has been minimized.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM FOMIULATION
Problem formulation has traditionally been viewed as an ill-structured
and unprogrammable process which differs from organization to organization,
from decision-maker to decision-maker, from problem to problem. If it is
not possible to develop generalizations about problem formulation, it is
not possible to develop generally applicable suggestions or techniques for
improving the process. However, research has demonstrated that it ij_
possible to develop generalizations about problem formulation and general
techniques for improving it.
There is a rich literature in the areas of cognitive psychology,
organizational behavior, and international relations which is applicable
to managerial problem formulation. This literature describes the process
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of problem formulation and outlines the potential malfunctions in the
process caused by the fact that decision-makers operate with limited
information and limited information processing capacities [51], [52].
The discussion which follows will draw upon this literature. First,
a general model of the problem finding/problem formulation process will
be developed. Next, organizational problems will be divided into two
categories and the unique aspects of problem formulation in each category
will be discussed. A variety of biases in problem formulation and decision-
making will then be listed and several individual and situational factors
which aggrevate these biases will be covered.
The Process of Problem Formulation
An early paper by Pounds [46] discusses the first part of the
problem formulation process: problem finding. Pounds clearly distin-
guishes problem finding from problem solving and offers a model of the
problem finding process drawn from Simon [51] and Miller, Galanter, &
Pribram [38]. Figure 2 represents his model:
Insert Figure 2 about here
Pounds describes the first four stages of his model as follows:
Managers have conceptual models of the operation of the firm and its
environment which they use to make predictions of outcomes important to
the firm such as sales volume, cost of sales, etc. The models are devel-
oped from the managers' experience, from formal planning models, other
people associated with the firm (customers, suppliers, etc.), or from
sources outside the organization such as trade journals or industry-wide
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groups [46, pp. 474-478]. In the first stage, they choose a model as
the basis for problem finding and make outcome predictions from it.
Once they have selected a model and made outcome predictions from
it, they compare these to reality in the second stage. In the third
and fourth stages, differences are identified (these constitute problems)
and one or more of the differences is selected for problem solving.
Problem solving consists of the selection and implementation of "oper-
ators"; elements of managerial activity which transform a set of input
variables into a set of output variables according to some predetermined
plan [46, p. 470].
As mentioned earlier. Pounds focuses on problem finding rather than
problem formulation or diagnosis . Once a difference has been identified
between predicted and actual outcomes, managers may use their own conceptual
models to identify causes of these differences. Pounds' model does not
explain how decision-makers react to different types of gaps (for ex-
ample, those indicating a crisis vs. those indicating an opportunity).
Nor does it explain how they search for information related to the causes
of the gap or how they define those causes.
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret [39] point out that differ-
ences between expectations and outcomes may be perceived as either op-
portunities, problems, or crises [39, p. 251]. They also expand Pounds'
discussion by adding an explicit diagnosis routine to the problem-
formulation process. Through studying managers' descriptions of 25
specific organizational decisions, they found that an explicit diagnostic
or formulation step could be identified for most of the decision-making
processes which were activated by problems. However, far fewer of the
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decision-making processes activated by opportunities and crises showed
an explicit diagnosis stage. Mintzberg, et. al,, suggest that opportuni-
ties may not require much problem definition since only improvement of
existing conditions is required rather than correction. On the other
hand, time pressures and cognitive pressures which discourage formal
diagnosis may be produced by crises. This point is supported in the
studies of Billings, Milburn and Schaalmar [3] and Smart and Vertinsky
[53].
The Mintzberg, et al. model includes the following phases and
subroutines, the first phase of which involves problem formulation:
A) The Identification Phase
1) The Decision Recognition Routine : Opportunities, prob-
lems, and crises are recognized and evoke decisional ac-
tivity.
2) The Diagnosis Routine : Information relevant to opportu-
nities, problems, and crises is collected and problems
are more clearly identified.
B) The Development Phase
3) The Search Routine : Organizational decision makers go
through a number of activities to generate alternative
solutions to problems.
4) The Design Routine : Ready-made solutions which have been
identified are modified to fit the particular problem or
new solutions are designed.
C) The Selection Phase
5) The Screen Routine ; This routine is activated when the
search routine generates more alternatives than can be
intensively evaluated. Alternatives are quickly scanned
and the most obviously infeasible are eliminated.
6) The Evaluation-Choice Routine : An alternative is chosen
either through a process of analysis and judgment or a
process of bargaining among decision makers.
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7) The Authorization Routine ; When the individual making
the decision does not have the authority to commit the
organization to a course of action, the decision must
move up the organizational hierarchy until it reaches a
level at which the necessary authority resides. [39,
pp. 252-263]
The authors also point out that the processes of problem formula-
tion and decision-making are generally not linear but cyclical . By
cycling within one phase or between phases, the decision-maker gradually
comes to comprehend a complex problem. Further, the most complex and
novel decisions seem to involve the greatest incidence of cycles.
Mintzberg, et al. state.
He (the decision-maker) may cycle within identification
to recognize the issue; during design, he may cycle
through a maze of nested design to develop a solution;
during evaluation, he may cycle to understand the
consequences of alternatives; he may cycle between
development and investigation to understand the problem
he is solving; he may cycle between selection and
development to reconcile goals with alternatives,
means with ends [37, p. 265].
Types of Strategic Problems and Differences in Problem Formulation
It may be that different types of strategic problems are formulated
differently. Maier has pointed out one important distinction between
problem types in his discussion of "Type I" and "Type II" problems [35
,
pp. 325-326] . With Type I problems, standards of high quality are applied
to solutions and it is not difficult to obtain acceptance of the solution
by those responsible for implementing it. Type II problems are those in
which internal political and bargaining processes are important and
acceptance of the solution is the most important evaluation of its
quality. Numerous theorists have discussed the characteristics of Type
II problems [31], [32], [47], [61].
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There seem to be at least two fundamental differences between the
problem-formulation process for Type I problems and Type II problems.
Lindblom's work [31], [32] on incremental decision-making processes sug-
gests that for strategic problems in which organizational acceptance is
the crucial factor, there may be little or no attempt to collect preliminary
information about the environment or to formulate the problem. Rather, the
problem is defined as a demand by various interest groups for a change in
some aspect of organizational policy. In response to this problem, the key
decision-makers make a small incremental change in organizational policy in
the direction demanded by the interest-groups. The decision-makers then
wait for reactions to the new policy from those who are affected by it
and modify it incrementally in the direction of the new demands. Lindblom
calls this the method of successive limited comparisons [31, p. 84J.
Maier [35, p. 348] has suggested that group decision-making may
be more important in dealing with Type II than Type I problems be-
cause it promotes acceptance of decisions. The role of the leader is
also important in assuring acceptance in Type II decision processes.
Vroom and Yetton [61] have suggested a related notion in their
discussion of a continuum of five possible levels of participation by
subordinates in organizational decision-making. In their model, the de-
gree of participation varies from the lowest level (the leader makes the
decision and announces it to the group) to the highest level (the leader
involves subordinates in the decision from beginning to end and accepts
the group's consensus decision). Vroom & Yetton specify a number of
contingencies which should help leaders determine how much participation
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to allow in the decision process. The importance of group acceptance
of the final solution is one of these contingencies.
Though the problem formulation process may be somewhat different
for different types of strategic problems, the same general model of
the decision-making process can be developed and used as a basis for
suggestions on improving the formulation process in all types of problems
in strategic planning. This model would include the following stages:
1) Gap identification/problem recognition
2) Problem diagnosis/formulation
3) Alternatives generation
A) Alternatives selection
At any point, decisional activity may cycle back to any previous stage.
For different types of problems, different stages should be empha-
sized. For Type II problems for example, very little activity is re-
quired at the problem diagnosis/formulation and the alternative genera-
tion stage. In fact, there may be no clearly identifiable diagnosis
stage. Also, group members should be involved at the alternative selec-
tion stage if more than one alternative was generated.
Biases and Malfunctions in Problem Formulation
Research in the areas of cognitive psychology, organizational behavior,
and international relations has uncovered a number of biases which afflict
decision-makers during problem foirmulation and the generation of alternatives
for solving problems once defined [23], [55]. A few of the many biases
identified in this literature will be discussed in order to illustrate
their effects on problem formulation and other decisional activities.
As has been suggested earlier, stage 1 of the problem formulation
process results from the recognition of a difference or gap between
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expectation and organizational performance. At this stage, decision-makers
sometimes avoid problems by not recognizing gaps. Forecasts of expected
organizational performance should be revised as new information comes
in, particularly if this information indicates that assumptions underlying
the forecasts were wrong. However, Tversky & Kahnemann [57] discuss
a decision heuristic called adjustment and anchoring which (among other
things) causes decision-makers to inadequately revise predictions as
new information comes in. They cite earlier research showing that decision-
makers are conservative information processors; that they develop an
initial judgment based on preliminary information and then anchor on
that judgment as they deal with new information. Their revisions are
smaller than are justified by the new information. Because decision-makers
use this heuristic, they may miss gaps and may therefore benefit from
techniques designed to stimulate the search for potential problems.
Decision-makers may escape the negative effects of this heuristic,
admit that the gap does exist, and move to stage 2: problem diagnosis/
formulation. If this happens, there is at least one heuristic which
helps to determine the manner in which the problem will be defined.
Steinbruner [54] calls this heuristic reasoning by analogy . Reasoning
by analogy involves the application of analogies and images from one
problem situation to another. In organizational decision-making, it
typically involves the application of analogies from simpler situations
or from memories of recently solved poblems to complex strategic deci-
sions. This helps to reduce the aversive uncertainty perceived in the
environment.
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However in strategic decisions, which involve a great deal of
uncertainty and complexity, the use of simple analogies is likely to
mislead the decision-maker into an overly simplistic view of the stra-
tegic decision situation [54, p. 115]. Research in cognitive psychology
[19] indicates that decision-makers' psychological set may induce a kind
of fixation on particular analogies or problem definitions. A decision
analyst who has dealt with a large number of organizational problems may
be able to suggest better analogies through matching a particular problem
to a "problem type" he has identified through his experience.
Once decision-makers have defined a problem, do they generally de-
velop numerous alternative solutions for dealing with it in stage 3?
Cyert and March [12] among others suggest that they do not. They suggest
that search for solutions to problems is simple-minded (it proceeds from
simple concepts of causality and is conducted in the neighborhood of
the problem symptom and the current alternative) and biased (that is,
it is distorted because of training of organizational members, their
hopes and expectations, and communication problems within the organiza-
tion) [12, pp. 120-122].
Steinbruner [54] elaborates on Cyert and March's notions of prob-
lemistic search in his description of a process he calls single outcome
calculations . Rather than attempting to specify all relevant values and
goals and all alternative courses of action as normative decision theory
would suggest, decision-makers may focus on a single one of their goals or
values and a single alternative course of action for achieving it. They
then simply refuse to consider other alternatives and in justifying their
choice, attempt to interpret facts in such a way that the favored alternativ(
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appears to serve several values simultaneously and appears to have no
costs associated with it. They attempt to deny that there are tradeoffs
and that there are some values which may not be served by their favored
alternatives. This is an extremely powerful simplification mechanism
and is more likely to be used in highly complex and uncertain decision
environments such as those characteristic of strategic planning. Since
this mechanism allows decision-makers to deny the unpleasant value trade-
offs which are always present in a choice between alternatives, it signifi-
cantly reduces the stress associated with ill-structured decision-making.
In any complex decision environment, several alternative courses
of action may be identified as new information comes to the decision-
makers. These alternatives are troublesome to a decision-maker using
single outcome calculations. There is at least one mechanism available
to decision-makers for dealing with unwanted alternatives: inferences
of impossibility . In contrast to the suggestions from normative decision
theory, decision-makers may devote a good deal of effort to pointing
out the negative aspects of non-preferred alternatives and attempting
to convince themselves that they are not possible to implement [54,
p. 119]. Since this mechanism forces premature rejection of alternatives,
it may have disastrous consequences for decision-makers who use it. They
will achieve a premature closure at the cost of rejecting possibly the
most feasible alternative.
These malfunctions and biases in problem-formulation cause problems
to be misdefined or to remain unrecognized and restrict the number of
alternatives generated to deal with these problems. The decision analyst
who concentrates only on the alternative selection phase of the process
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and does not help decision-makers to correctly formulate the problem and
generate good alternatives for solving it may find himself helping them
to solve the wrong problem or to choose the best from among several
low-quality alternatives for solving it.
Individual and Situational Factors
The biases and mechanisms previously discussed distort problem
formulation even under the most ideal conditions. However, individual
and situational factors may greatly magnify the impact of these mechanisms
on the quality of problem formulation. Stress and tension may cause
decision-makers to become stereotyped in their attempts at problem de-
finition or to devote little or no time to problem definition. Person-
ality factors such as dogmatism and cognitive complexity may effect pro-
cedures chosen for problem definition.
Goldstein and Blackman [18, pp. 98-100] discuss a number of studies
which suggest that highly dogmatic decision-makers tend to make judgments
about data necessary for problem-definition quickly and not to defer
judgment until sufficient data are available to make an informed judg-
ment. Further, they cite evidence that high dogmatics adopt simple
strategies for processing information and use small amounts of informa-
tion in making judgments because of their great need to reduce uncer-
tainty.
They also discuss the effects of cognitive complexity on the forma-
tion of judgments [18, pp. 118-125]. Evidence suggests that cognitively
complex people make more inferences from information and are better able
to integrate discrepant information in making judgments.
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Stress induced by time pressure and other factors may also influ-
ence the decision-maker's tendency to quickly choose simple analogies
to help in defining the problem. Stress may also cause decision-makers
to avoid dealing with the problem altogether.
Under high levels of stress, the need to escape from the decision
situation may become acute and decision-makers may resort to one of two
types of behaviors whose primary purpose is escape rather than resolu-
tion of the problem. These behaviors have been described by Janis and
Mann [26, p. 52] as defensive avoidance and hypervigilance . Defensive
avoidance on the part of decision-makers involves attempts to avoid the
problem by ignoring information about it, developing an overly fatalistic
attitude about their ability to affect outcomes, or relying on others
to make the decision (buck passing). Hypervigilance is commonly called
"panic behavior" and involves making snap decisions generally on the
basis of the first bits of information to become available. This be-
havior is often observed when decision-makers feel they do not have time
to collect information and evaluate alternatives.
Cohen, March, and Olsen [9, p. 33] discuss two related problem
avoidance processes which they call flight and oversight . Flight involves
reactively applying a solution to a problem which has traditionally
been applied and failed to solve it. Oversight occurs when a choice
between a number of courses of action is made without consideration
of any of the organizational problems which might be resolved by the
choice. The authors claim that flight and oversight are the most common
approaches to decision-making in organizations [9, p. 34].
-18-
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Decision analysts may be unable to prevent defensive avoidance or
flight. However, by helping managers to more effectively use their time
in problem solving when time is in short supply, they may be able to
minimize hypervigilance. By encouraging decision-makers to specify out-
comes and the subjective probability of each outcome, they may be able
to discourage decision by oversight.
-.,_
Summary
In this section, a general model of problem formulation has been
developed. Its applicability to different types of problems has been
discussed and a number of possible malfunctions in the problem formulation
process have been considered. This discussion has shown that problem
formulation can be modeled, that managers can make a variety of errors
in the process, and that decision analysts can and should assist managers
in problem formulation in order to avoid being put in the position of
helping managers choose between a number of low quality alternatives
for solving the wrong problem.
DECISION AIDS IN PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, four types of decision aids will be discussed.
The first three are, in sequential order: matching of problem to problem
type approaches, creativity stimulants—aids for generating new ideas,
and devil's advocate/dialectical inquiry approaches. Each of these is
designed for dealing with difficulties at a particular stage in the
problem solving or strategic planning process. However, each technique
may also indirectly affect all stages. The fourth aid discussed involves
the use of decision analysis as a stimulus for policy dialogue. Finally,
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an integrative model is presented which shows the appropriate use of these
approaches at various stages in the process.
Matching of 'problem' to 'problem type' approach
Reference to earlier writing on decision analysis suggests that
researchers have either elected to avoid the problem of how to elicit
the structure of a decision situation or have argued that such decompo-
sition and structuring skills can only be 'learned by doing.' To
illustrate the first view Ulvila [58] has, for example, indicated that
there are few, if any, computer aids available for structuring although
a number had been developed for aiding solution procedures. Raiffa [48]
also implied that he would prefer to by-pass the structuring problem in
decision analysis even though he considered it an important issue. The
second view of learning by experience in decision analysis has much support
(Moore and Thomas [43], Brown, Kahr and Peterson [6], Holloway [24]) as a
practical guideline. This view suggests that managers, through recogni-
tion of patterns or familiar problems, become more aware of certain pro-
blems and problem-types, (i.e., they have gone through some form of pre-
diagnosis and can "reason by analogy" to them) . This form of awareness
can be described as internal learning about problems. Often, however,
this internal learning is not translated into organizational learning
either because of lack of communication or because of poor maintenance
of records in organizational settings.
As a consequence it has been suggested that a taxonomy of problem
types, (e.g., new product, manufacturing investments, etc.), should be
developed so that the problem solver could be aided early in a decision
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analysis by being able to make a comparison of his particular problem
with this taxonomy. This approach would also be reinforced by external
learning. That is, by managers reading accounts of case studies of
applications performed in other organizations or by consultants. There
is, by now, an increasing volume of such case studies and applications
reprinted in the literature (see, for example, Brown, Kahr and Peterson
[6]; Holloway [24]; Bell, Keeney, and Raiffa [2]; Kaufman and Thomas [28];
Moore, Thomas, Bunn, and Hampton [44]), and the range of reported appli-
cations continues to widen.
Interestingly, over the last ten years the areas of application
have moved from well-structured and well-programmed problems to
increasingly ill-structured and strategic ones. Recently, public sector
applications have been more in evidence.
There are dangers, however, in the managerial use of the 'matching
of problem to problem type' approach as a problem formulation aid. First,
externally reported applications of decision analysis often appear to be
too easy and simplistic and to be examples of 'techniques in search of
solutions.' In addition, the descriptions rarely provide sufficient
detail and do not adequately catalogue some of the difficulties
—
problem
identification, assumption testing, problem formulation, structuring
and assessment—involved in applications. That is, they do not throw
sufficient light on the structuring and problem formulation phases of
decision analysis.
Second, recent events might tend to make a particular problem
type obsolete. A good example of this lies in insurance decision-
making. The impact of inflation upon the operations of insurance firms
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in the second half of the 1970s has significantly changed the balance
between their underwriting and investment activities. Many individual
insurance accounts (for example, for the insurance of marine , fire , and
automobile risks) now show underwriting losses which are more than
balanced by the rapid increases in investment gains generated by the
continuing high levels of interest rates. As a result the view and
premise held in the stable environment of the 1960's, namely, that
'underwriting profit is king' has eroded and has been replaced by a
more adaptive strategic balancing posture which looks at the joint
impacts of underwriting, investments, and claims upon the overall profit-
ability of the insurance company.
Third, in some reported applications decision analysts may have
biased the manager's perception of the problem and in so doing provided
an inappropriate problem formulation and ultimately, an incorrect solu-
tion. For example, a decision analyst whose primary training background
is in management science models might define every problem as a mathe-
matical programming, resource allocation type of problem. As a result
he might ignore potential problem differences and the availability of
other solution procedures. Fourth, this type of approach is probably
better suited to well-structured than ill-structured problems since it
relies on such things as the recognition of familiar problem patterns
and the presence or absence of key problem variables.
Nevertheless, the continued development of a taxonomy of problem
types is an useful first step in helping the process of 'reasoning by
analogy' even though it may 'anchor' the decision-maker's thinking
around a previously developed problem structure and solution. However,
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such a taxonomy should be based on case studies of ill-structured, complex
problems. These case studies should catalogue the resolution of issues
both in relation to problem formulation and policy dialogue about "messy"
problems.
Creativity Stimulants
Typically when more structured approaches and analytic aids do not
help with problem formulation, managers must search for new options.
In those instances, consultants may assist through the use methods for
developing creative alternatives. In some cases, these methods encourage
new problem definitions as means to developing new alternatives.
Certain conditions are important prerequisites for creative thinking.
First, the organizational conditions have to be designed to allow the
bridge between thought, creativity and idea generation to be built
effectively. At minimum this means that there must be tangible organi-
zational commitment to the creative search process. For example, there
must be reduced stress and pressure on managers so that they have suffi-
cient time to think about problems and gather and absorb any appropriate
information about them. Second, creative thinking aids must be designed
to include certain key features. For example, aids should attempt to
free managers from conceptual or perceptual blocks to thinking and the in-
fluence of any inhibiting factors whilst simultaneously encouraging the
utilization of past problem solving experience. In addition, aids
should also make effective use of devices for introducing alternative
ideas and problem critiques into the creative process. This controlled
introduction of viewpoints should allow managers to consider, in a
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broadly based manner, the influence of other ideas and assumptions about
the decision problem. Thus, the mind's natural ability to explore the
unknown and its natural curiosity about conflicting signals and incomplete
problem linkages can be tapped. This curiousity ultimately leads managers
to attempt to "complete the incomplete" and recombine the signals and
linkages in a subjectively meaningful form, i.e., to attempt to achieve
"order out of chaos".
'
The literature on creative aids is somewhat diffuse and piecemeal
and some techniques have not been subjected to thorough scientific testing.
However, an overview of some of the main classes of methods is presented
below in order to provide some tentative operational guidelines for their
use.
In this brief review it is not possible to discuss the full range
of approaches for generating ideas and new alternatives. Instead, the
concepts underlying some widely used approaches are examined in succeeding
paragraphs. The structured approaches considered include brainstorming,
synectics, morphological analyses and Delphi approaches. Unstructured
approaches are limited to techniques for generating scenarios and alter-
native futures. Unstructured approaches attempt to stimulate the genera-
tion of new ideas whereas structured approaches try to systematically
organize ideas and synthesize patterns from a broader set of ideas and
viewpoints.
Brainstorming
This is a group procedure [see Osbom [45]] usually involving a
nominated chairperson. The group is usually of small size and goes through
-24-
a number of phases such as fact-finding, idea-finding and solution-finding
in the brainstorming process.
The group is co-ordinated by a leader, who, having socialized the
group and defined the problem and group agenda, sets the framework for
the idea-finding phase. Typically, the group is counselled to operate
in a mode in which judgment about suggested ideas is deferred and crit-
icism is held back. It is stressed that group members should think
freely, generate as many ideas as they wish and, if appropriate, build
on ideas suggested by other members of the group. Once all possible
ideas have been generated the leader should attempt to synthesize the
ideas and try to focus further brainstorming on criteria by which alter-
native ideas should be judged. The best ideas are then listed and group
members are asked to develop strategies for implementation and adoption
of these ideas.
Existing research suggests that individuals brainstorming separately
produce a larger number of high quality ideas than do interacting groups.
The main advantage of the group may lie with the ease of organizing brain-
storming and the group's cohesion in subsequently gaining acceptance of
new ideas and proposals.
Synectics
This is a group creative thinking process [see Gordon [19]] directed
by a leader responsible for encouraging certain reasoning mechanisms in
the group members. The leader directs a thinking by analogy process in
which a series of creative ideas are generated by evoking appropriate
analogies. This approach involves the use of a trained and skilled
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leader who possesses the ability to understand group dynamics, psycholog-
ical strain, role playing and to facilitate and catalyze group communication
and committment. The leader should also direct the group towards approval
of the ideas generated in the synectic process.
Morphological analysis
This approach, originally developed by Zwicky [63] in the context
of the Apollo project, is a structured search technique particularly
useful for situations of novelty such as new process or product development
in an environment of rapid technological change. An attempt is made to
promote openmindedness by encouraging decision-makers to identify the
characteristics or attributes defining the novel situation and to define
a list of all possible combinations of attributes which can be generated
from them. The process continues by reviewing each feasible combination
and trying to devise a problem solution which may fit that combination.
The intention is that one or more alternative solutions from the range
of potential solutions generated will be, at least, worth detailed con-
sideration for potential implementation. In essence, the process tries
to bring ideas into conjunction with alternative specifications of the
situation Ce.g.j a weapons system) under study. By such directed mapping,
it is anticipated that creative and novel solutions will be found.
The Delphi approach
Linstone and Turoff [33] provide a very broad definition of the
Delphi method as follows: 'Delphi may be characterized as a method for
structuring a group communication process so that the process is
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effactive in allowing a group of individuals as a whole, to deal with a
complex problem.
'
The Delphi procedure follows a series of phases in which a group
of people anonymously participate in a problem solving process and in
which the group's response (say, in terms of generation of alternatives
for a problem situation) from the previous phase is given as feedback
for the next phase. This feedback, is controlled and synthesized so that
at each phase some assessment of the group judgment (or consensus) is
provided and an opportunity is presented for each individual to revise,
change or revise his or her views.
Van de Ven and Delbecq [59] compared the effectiveness for decision-
makers of Delphi, nominal group (i.e., nominal brainstorming groups)
and interactive group meetings. Their conclusion was that both the
nominal and Delphi approaches were more effective than interacting groups
in producing high quality ideas and that the nominal approach was marginally
more effective than Delphi.
Delphi has been used widely in applications such as the forecasting
of future technological change and for idea generation for strategic
planning in relation to organizational policy formulation. Linstone
and Turoff's book [33] reviews a wide range of applications of the
approach which seek to elicit either facts, ideas or decisions in or-
ganizational problem-solving.
Scenarios /Alternative Futures
A scenario can be described as a description of how some set of
events defining a problem situation might come about over some defined
-27-
period of time in the future. It is most often developed by decision-
makers in order to throw light upon the strategies which a business or
public sector organization might take in confronting and adapting to an
uncertain future. Usually a number of scenarios of alternative futures
are developed to reflect a range of uncertain future conditions. Very
often three scenarios are generated to reflect so-called pessimistic ,
most likely , and optimi stic sets of future conditions.
Such generation of scenarios requires that individual decision-makers
attempt contemplation about future events by adopting a "fantasy mode of
thinking" in order that they can anticipate future events and surprises
which cannot be predicted through the use of common extrapolative fore-
casting techniques. Decision aids such as logic trees, fault trees, and
other structuring devices can help this contemplation process but the bur-
den rests upon decision-makers' insights and creativity in judging the
course of future events.
Earlier sections of this paper have pointed to biases in judgment
about uncertain events and Hogarth [22] also reports on judges'
difficulties in assessing future events in relation to a long-term
future. Pierre Wack, a noted expert on scenario forecasting in Shell
International, in disciissing Shell's use of scenarios [62] points out
that they currently ask decision-makers to assess only pessimistric and
optimistic scenarios. This is because past use of a most likely scenario
in addition to the pessimistic and optimistic cases had the effect of
narrowing the range of scenarios confronted by decision-makers. An
explanation for this finding is the anchoring and adjustment bias of
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Tversky and Kahneman [57]. That is, decision-makers 'anchor' around
the most likely scenario (often an extrapolation of the status quo) and
make an inadequate adjustment around the 'anchor' in order to develop
the pessimistic and optimistic scenario. •;
.tj:'
Though scenario development has sometimes been criticized as being
unrealistic, it is an useful aid for drawing attention to the impact of
alternative futures and in generating ideas for confronting such potential
futures.
II
The Devil's Advocate and Dialectical Inquiry
Writers in organizational behavior have recommended two techniques
for the introduction of interpersonal conflict into the strategic plan-
ning process [15], [16], [36], [37], [40], [41], [42], Mitroff and Emshoff
[40] and Mason and Mitroff [37] have suggested that there are three activ-
ities which can improve the quality of strategic planning in uncertain
environments. The first is the generation of conflict between decision
makers or within a decision maker. The second is the identification of
assumptions regarding the internal and external environment and the nature
of the problem. The third is the challenging of these assumptions.
Two techniques which may help to promote these activities (con-
flict, assumption identification, and assumption challenging) have been
offered as aids to the strategy formulation process. These techniques,
called the dialectical inquiry (DI), devil's advocate (DA), are seen as
improvements on the traditional expert (E) approach in which decision
makers formulate strategy with the help of advice from experts (such as
decision analysts). In this approach members of a planning department or
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consultants provide expert advice regarding the definition or structuring
of the problem and the plans the organization should follow. The planners
make a study of the organization's environment (opportunities and threats),
its resources (strengths and weaknesses), its value structure, and its
social responsibilities. The result of this study is a definition of
the planning problem and a set of planning recommendations which are
usually presented to management in the form of a strategic briefing
session. Mason suggested that the planning recommendations contain
hidden assumptions which are frequently not communicated to management.
These, in turn, effect the structure of the problem. This is one of the
most critical drawbacks of the E approach [36, pp. B406-B407].
The DI was first proposed as an aid to strategy formulation by
Mason [36]. Mason, building on C. West Churchman's [7] ideas, suggested
that a dialectical approach to decision-making would involve examining
a decision situation completely and logically from two different and
opposing points of view.
The dialectical process as incorporated into the DI involves
three basic steps. First, a thesis is developed and a "case" for the
thesis is constructed.
Next, the antithesis is developed and defended. A true antithesis
is the "deadliest enemy" of the thesis and should stimulate "an anti-
conviction of forcefulness at least as great as the conviction (in the
plan)" [8, p. 172], The antithesis must be a different plan or posi-
tion (not necessarily the opposite of the thesis) which has the maximum
amount of credibility and can present the strongest challenge to the
thesis in order to generate this anti-conviction. According to Churchman
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[8, p. 172], the clearest example of this "deadliest enemy" concept is
found in politics. The deadliest enemy of democracy, says Churchman,
is not nondemocracy, but a very explicit and detailed political design
called the Communist Party.
Finally, the synthesis emerges from the efforts of an observer of
the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. This observer is op-
posed to the conflict and wishes to bring it to an end but understands
the world-view or assumptions underlying both the thesis and the anti-
thesis. This observer constructs yet another world-view which is more
"objective" than that underlying either the thesis or antithesis. The
act of generating the synthesis as well as its perceived ability to
resolve the conflict between the thesis and antithesis tends to generate
a strong conviction regarding its truth in the mind of the individual (s)
who developed it.
The DI is a specific method for applying Churchman's ideas to
strategic planning and ill-structured decision-making. This method
begins by identifying the prevailing or recommended strategic plan in
an organization and the data which were used to derive it. Next, an
attempt is made to identify the assumptions underlying the plan. In
order to test these assumptions, a counterplan is identified which is
feasible, politically viable, and generally credible but which rests
on assumptions different from those supporting the plan.
A structured debate is then conducted. This debate, in contrast
to a traditional management briefing, consists of forceful presenta-
tions of two opposing plans which rest on different interpretations of
the same data. The debate demonstrates that the same data can be
-31-
interpreted by the advocates of both the plan and the counterplan as providing
support for their positions. This in turn should cause those witnessing
the debate (those executives responsible for actually formulating the
strategy) to focus on and evaluate the assumptions underlying the plan
and counterplan [36, p. B408]. Once assumptions have been changed,
these form the basis of a new (and better) definition of the problem
and a more effective strategy for solving it. Mitroff, Emshoff, &
Kilmann [42, p. 583] have suggested that the DI is a methodology for
problem formulation especially suited to ill-structured issues.
There is an alternative approach to strategy formulation which
Mason [36] called the DA approach. He asserted that this approach
should be more effective than the E approach but less effective than
the DI approach. In this approach, a planner appears before manage-
ment and advocates a plan. Another planner then takes the role of an
adverse and often carping critic of the plan. An attempt is made to
determine all that is wrong with the plan and to expound the reasons why
the plan should not be adopted. The plan and critique are then presented
to management and form the bases for revision of the plan. Figure 3
shows the process.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Mason suggested that while this approach does expose some under-
lying assumptions, it does so in the context of what is wrong with them
rather than what they should be. It does not serve to develop a new
managerial world view. For this reason. Mason felt that the DI approach
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should be more helpful in the strategy formulation task than the DA
approach [36, pp. B407-B408].
Other writers have also discussed the improvement of organizational
decision-making through the use of the DA. Herbert & Estes [21] discussed
the DA as a way of formalizing dissent in the strategy formulation process.
They suggested that an individual, either within or outside the organization,
should be appointed to the position of Devil's Advocate for any major
organizational decision in which it is desirable to introduce conflict.
The Devil's Advocate should begin with the formal statement of a proposed
course of action and the analysis underlying the proposal. He should then
examine the proposal for inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and irrelevancies
and prepare a critique of the proposal based on this examination. A kind
of confrontation session between an advocate of the original proposal
and the Devil's Advocate is then held with key organizational decision-
makers as observers. Based on this confrontation session the organi-
zational decision makers can then accept the proposal, modify it, or
develop a completely new proposal based on a more complete understanding
of the proposal's shortcomings.
Also, Janis [25] pointed out that the informal use of Devil's Advo-
cates was one of the positive features of the decision-making process in
President Kennedy's policy-making staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
The President's brother, Robert, and Theodore Sorensen were instructed to
assume the Devil's Advocate role and to promote conflict in order to pre-
vent errors arising from too superficial analysis of the issues [25,
pp. 147-148]. This, along with other changes in the group dynamics of
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the President's policy-making group, was credited with the effectiveness
in the group's decision-making processes during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Janis also made the following recommendation for the improvement of the
process of public policy-making:
At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy
alternatives, at least one member should be
assigned the role of devil's advocate.
[26, p. 216]
The DI and DA can help deepen decision-makers' understanding of a
problem. Mason [36, p. B411] suggests that the use of the DI will help
decision-makers form a "new, more encompassing conceptualization of the
problem." In other words, it will lead to better problem formulation.
Evidence from field studies provides some support for Mason's assertions
[16], [36], [41]. Since the problem formulation process is cyclical,
the DA and DI may improve this natural cycling process and assure that
it includes the identification of assumptions. These techniques begin
with a proposed solution to an organizational problem and, through
questioning the assumptions underlying the solution, force the decision-
makers to return to the problem diagnosis stage.
Of course, forcing decision-makers to re-examine assumptions after
they have already generated a solution may be disruptive and emotion-
ally unpleasant. This, plus the extra time involved in a decision-
making process using the DA or DI, might cause decision-makers to
resist these techniques. Because the DA is a somewhat simpler and
more straightforward process, it might be more palatable to decision-
makers than the DI. Also, there is evidence from laboratory studies
that the DA improves prediction performance, alternatives generation.
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and overall quality of strategy statements more than the DI [11], [49],
[50]. On the other hand, a combination of the DA and DI might be the
most effective approach.
Decision Analysis As An Aid For Policy Dialogue
In this conception of the role of decision analysis there is no
meaningful distinction between decision analysis and problem formulation.
Rather, analysis and formulation are parts of a policy dialogue process
which aims to provide a decision aid and a 'thinking structure' for ill-
structured problems. This dialogue process is seen to be a cyclic search
process in which analysis is used in an iterative, adaptive, and flexible
manner so that decision-makers are encouraged to cycle back through
previous stages of the analysis. Thus, it provides a framework for problem
formulation through the continual presentation of problem solutions based
on alternative sets of problem assumptions. This may ultimately lead to
the development of a set of guidelines which can be used as a basis for
framing policy. The essential features of the dialogue approach to decision
analysis are described and illustrated in subsequent paragraphs.
a) Developing a Systems Model
Policy design and dialogue should begin with problem finding and
decision structuring. The basis of the initial phase of problem finding
should be an attempt to structure the issues and analyze the decision-
making environment, thereby giving the decision-maker an opportunity to
explore possible structural frameworks amd assumptions underlying alter-
nate problem formulations. This exploration may be performed with some
form of decision tree or logic tree as the structuring framework, and with
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the results of an initial screening procedure or 'first-pass' decision
analysis available to the decision-making group for purposes of discussion
and debate.
b) Policy Design: Structuring and Modelling
It is argued here that any systems model for policy dialogue should
have a narrow, specific focus and be designed to answer particular defined
questions. That is, it is better to start with a simple model rather than
over-complicate the process. In such a model the important uncertain vari-
ables would be identified and the problem defined adequately in terms of
its anticipated time horizon and scope and through the generation of a
range of potential alternative actions. The outputs of such a model
would normally be the set of alternatives valued in terms of a number of
indicator variables. Such variables could be thought of as "attributes"
by which the alternatives should be judged e.g., cash flow, potential cost
and R&D expenditure. These indicator variables, or attributes, would
typically be presented as a stream or range of values for each period of
the specified time horizon,
c) The Goal of Policy Structuring and Modelling
The initial structuring and modelling described in a) and b) gives
the decision-making/policy group immediate feedback on their initial
formulation of the problem under study. This, in turn, develops greater
system understanding and develops the dialogue about a more appropriate
policy design.
The development of a system model which will be acceptable to all
members of the decision-making group is an extremely important part of
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the process of bringing formal decision analytic methods into closer
proximity with the realities of the "policy-setting" situation. It is
crucial that there be consensus as to applicability of the model because
it provides a framework within which the responsibilities and requirements
for formal analysis can be divided and delegated amongst the individuals
who form the decision-making group. The individuals then jointly become
responsible for the tasks of information gathering, evaluation, and
assessment of uncertainties and value measures. Finally, through group
negotiations and bargaining a preferred strategy option may be chosen.
d) Obtaining Alternative Policy Prescriptions
The aim of initial policy design is to provide additional starting
points or policy prescriptions. The first-pass initial analysis works
from a basic narrow, specific model which focuses on the crucial aspects
of the problem. Through the use of analysis (often of the decision
analysis /simulation type) time streams of different policy indicators
can be presented in order to provide starting points for the generation
of more realistic alternatives for dialogue, modification and change.
That is, alternative policy prescriptions may be suggested from group
dialogue which should be examined and subjected to feasibility testing.
e) Evaluating Alternative Prescriptions
The message here is that the goal of the policy evaluation process
is to obtain a reasonable set of policy alternatives. Therefore, the
evaluation process should move in an adaptive, iterative manner towards
a comparison of alternatives in terms of the indicator variables and
check on the sensitivity of these alternatives to error, misestimation
-37-
and future surprises. A set of policy alternatives is then available for
consideration by members of the decision-making group.
f) Implementation of Prescriptions
The message here is that adaptive/flexible mechanisms lead to
successful implementation. The more extensive the previous policy
dialogue, the greater the likelihood that the decision-making group will
have confronted the range of organizational and other factors which will
influence implementation. However, a check must be made on the feasibility
of implementation in relation to resources, competition, and other con-
straints and, if appropriate, some alternative strategies should be
discarded and others added to the strategy space.
It is argued, therefore, that the greatest emphasis in policy dia-
logue and design must be on the flexibility and adaptability built into
the analytic process. For example, it is preferable to describe the
outcomes of alternative policies in terms of a time-stream of indicator
variables, rather than in terms of a single criterion such as expected
utility whether or not that utility function is expressed in multi-
attributed form. In this manner policies can be examined even more
closely to see whether they fit when excluded factors and problem assump-
tions are reexamined. The key message is that synthesis, the offering
and examination of new options in the strategy space, is even more necessary
in the resolution of ill-structured problems than in well-structured
problems. This is consistent with Ackoff 's systems-oriented views.
It should be noted that there is a need to distinguish between the
direct value and the indirect value of a decision analysis in understanding
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its use in policy dialogue. Direct value refers to the process of finding
the optimal act. Direct value is not stressed in this paper since the
focus is centered around the consideration of complex, ill-structured
problems. On the other hand, the indirect value of decision analysis
and its positive role as a decision aid is stressed here. Indirect
value is concerned with such issues as assiunption and reality testing
of alternative formulations and increasing debate and awareness about
the influence of problem structure on policy prescription.
CONCLUSION
In this paper it is argued that problem formulation has not received
sufficient attention in the context of applied decision analysis and that fc
this reason many have suggested it is of little value in strategic planning.
Using working definitions of the terms problem and problem formulation
a review of the literature on organizational problem formulation re-
sulted in a synthetic general model of the problem formulation process
which would include the following stages in cyclic form:
1) Gap identification/problem recognition
2) Problem diagnosis/formulation
3) Alterantives generation
4) Alternatives selection
Possible malfunctions and biases in this process may, without
guidance and counselling, lead to decision-makers presenting decision
analysts with a diet of low quality alternatives for solving the wrong
problem. Therefore, some aids for the problem formulation process were
reviewed and their strength and weakness pointed out. ' Matching problem
to problem type ' approaches were seen to be of particular value for
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handling well-structured porblems and for conditioning decision-makers to
problem elements. On the other hand, creativity stimulants are seen to
be necessary when the problem formulation process becomes stagnant and new
insights and more creative alternatives are required. Although some of
the approaches require skilled group leaders they have demonstrated some
success in removing perceptual and conceptual blocks for problem formu-
lation. The devil's advocate and dialectical inquiry are forms of
structured debate to generate a focus around problem assumptions
and crucial issues. The evidence suggests that they are effective, if
sometimes time-consuming, in expanding and clarifying problem definition
and generating feasible alternatives, ideas and high quality strategies
in the context of ill-structured problem situations. Analysis for
policy dialogue was seen to be an useful aid for formulation in most
situations. An exploratory 'first-pass' analysis can be developed and
subjected to review and comment by the decision-making group. In the
course of this process debate about the problem should become focussed
around the questioning of assumptions and the generation of new alternative
viewpoints and strategies.
Figure 4 below shows a conceptualization of the integration of decision
aids into the problem formulation process.
Insert Figure 4 about here
This figure illustrates the stages of the problem formulation/problem
solving/decision making process in strategic planning outlined earlier.
The process involves a number of potential cycles from later to earlier
n.
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stages. Each of the decision aids previously discussed is normally intro-
duced at a particular stage. However, the techniques have impacts on all
phases. The matching of problem to problem type approach which helps
determine the problem formulation, also constrains the types of alterna-
tives generated and may influence choice criteria. The creativity stimu-
lants discussed may be introduced during the alternatives generation
phase when alternative generation has stagnated. However, in revitaliz-
ing alternatives generation, these aids may lead to different formula-
tions of the problem. Dialectical inquiry and devil's advocate methods
are structured approaches for moving from the selection to the problem
formulation phase through questioning the assumptions in an expert's
recommendations. Policy dialogue, in which decisions analysis is used
ostensibly to assist in selection of alternatives, should result in
problem redefinition.
Though this flow diagram and conceptualization can be regarded as
preliminary, it reflects the experience of the authors. For a recent
example of the application of this concept see Thomas [56]. In practice,
most applied decision analyses are cyclic in nature and different
problem formulations are constantly tried. The importance of focussing
on the right problem as quickly and effectively as possible is clear if
applied decision analysis is to maintain its momentum as an approach
and solution dialogue for handling ill-structured strategic planning
problems. It should be pointed out that the figure does not imply that
each and every decision aid must be applied in a particular problem
situation. The different aids provide the decision-makers with a range
of 'frames' of the problem environment which, if sensibly developed and
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applied, should lessen the risk of committing the 'error of the third kind'
[48] in decision analysis, that is, solving the wrong problem.
M/C/282
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FIGURE 2
POUNDS' MODEL OF THE PROBLEM FINDING/PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
-y\ Choose a model
\/_
Compare to reality
V.
Identify differences
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Problem
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^
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\/
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\/
Select an operator
Execute the operator
Problem
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[46, p. 472]
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FIGURE 3
A (DA) -BASED PLANNING MODEL
I.) Critique Development
Original >- Data >• Assumption »• Critique
Strategies Identification
II.) Strategy Formulation
Final -< Revised -< Assumption -» Data
Strategy Assumptions Discussion
[49, p. 132]
FIGURE 4
APPROPRIATE USES OF DECISION
AIDS IN THE PROBLEM
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